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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY GROUND FORCES
Army War College
Washington 25, D. C.

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1 May 1945.

R.D-11596-3

SUBJECT: Observer's Report - OKINAWA OPERATION.

TO : Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Army War College,
Washington 25, D. C.

Section I - Assignment

1. In compliance with letter, War Department, 15 February 1945, file AGPO-A-210.482 (12 February 1945), the undersigned, together with Colonel James H. Howe, Lt. Colonel Walter J. Preston, Lt. Colonel Homer Trimble, and Lt. Colonel Robert C. Williams, Jr., all from Army Ground Forces, departed from Washington, D. C., 23 February 1945, and reported to the Commander in Chief, Navy on 26 February 1945 for temporary duty as observers.
2. Pursuant to 1st indorsement, on above stated War Department letter, dated 27 February 1945 from Commander in Chief, Navy, all officers mentioned in paragraph 1 above were attached to XXIV Corps for temporary duty in connection with the Okinawa Operation.
3. By verbal agreement between observers, it was decided that each officer would cover certain activities and thus have a complete coverage without duplication. Accordingly the following sub-divisions were made showing what each officer would report on: -

Colonel W. N. Todd, Jr. - Staff functions, G-1 and G-2 sections.

Colonel James H. Howe - Amphibious operations.

Lt. Colonel Walter J. Preston - Artillery and equipment.

Lt. Colonel Homer Trimble - Engineers, G-4 Section and Special Staff.

Lt. Colonel Robert C. Williams, Jr. - Overall operations and G-3 section.

4. Based on above plan, this report will cover only staff functioning and the G-1 and G-2 sections. For information covering other phases reference should be made to reports submitted by the other observers.

Section II - G-1 Activities

This report covers the operation of the XXIV Corps, the 7th and 96th Divisions while under combat conditions on the target area from 1 April to 13 April, 1945 and a conference with the 77th Division prior to departure for the target area on 8 March 1945.

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Report Documentation Page

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14. ABSTRACT Report included data collected on staff procedures, training, organization, equipment, supply, tactics, and techniques with particular attention to infantry matters. The report covers the period 3 March 1945 to 9 April 1945. It is based on interviews with officers and enlisted men of all units in XXIV Corps, both while the Corps was at Leyte and Okinawa as well as personal observations.				
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a. XXIV Corps - (Personal interview with Major General J.R. HODGES, Commanding, 15 March 1945).

The T/O for staff of an army corps is totally inadequate for amphibious operations. New staff sections, not contemplated in the drafting of the T/Os, are required, these include an air section, naval gun fire section and a transport quartermaster section. Present T/Os on the corps conceived as purely a tactical unit, supported by an elaborate logistical set-up. Yet, in all campaigns conducted by this Corps, exclusive of its amphibious phases, the logistic functions assumed necessarily by the Corps were far in excess of those incident to normal ground operations. The corps must unload all of its assault equipment and supplies, establish dumps and operate a port for a considerable time after the assault landing. Even after the port is turned over to a service agency, new conditions will arise, especially when landing on large land masses where the divisions will be widely separated requiring the entire logistical support to rest squarely upon the corps, which has no service troops with which to operate. The Corps staff is presently operating under an augmented T/O 100-1 (see annex #1) which is still inadequate but all that can be obtained under present conditions. Current T/Os make no allowance for public relations, which is authorized and a necessary and vital function of a corps staff.

Operations in heavily populated areas present a major problem in handling of civil affairs. Even in countries where natives are friendly the problem of herding them around and controlling them requires a large number of military police. There are no provisions for this under the Military Government Teams assigned to the divisions and corps and the responsibility rests on the combat commander. The one military police company assigned to the corps is a mere drop in the bucket. It is necessary to call in many hundreds of additional troops from combat and service units in the early stages of combat for military police duties. As we get into future operations where the natives are actually hostile, the problem of their control will be greatly increased. Adequate military police support must be provided to relieve combat troops and commands of the drain imposed by improvising military policemen.

The amount of work and additional duties imposed on the Headquarters Company of the Corps in amphibious operations, in handling the numerous attached units not self-supporting and the necessary larger staffs, is far in excess of their capabilities. At present the XXIV Corps has approximately ninety (90) units under its administrative control constituting a command of about twenty thousand (20,000) troops. Under normal operating conditions the Corps has from forty (40) to fifty (50) smaller units attached to it for administration, totalling approximately ten thousand (10,000) troops.

The general and special staff sections in corps headquarters are not adequately staffed to properly administer and supply this group of attached units. A headquarters, special troops could assume responsibility for administration and supply.

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There is a definite need in the corps for a casual company. Due to the distances and the lack of transportation (rail, water and motor) in this theater, it is not possible to ship casuals direct to units. It was found that casuals released from hospitals were individually trying to bum rides or walk back to their units, that no one was responsible for them, and in many cases they had no place to eat or sleep. Therefore a casual detachment was set up in this Corps where all casuals are assembled, given a good place to eat and sleep, reissued clothing and equipment when necessary and provided transportation back to their unit. This helps the morale of the men and makes them feel they are wanted and are being taken care of. In order to do this, however, the Corp had to take men from a combat unit (see annex #2).

b. Division Staff Section: -

- (1) 7th Division - is operating under T/O. However, they have increased Headquarters Company by one (1) officer and sixteen (16) men to take care of attached personnel.
- (2) 96th Division - the G-1 Section handles officer promotions, instead of Adjutant General section, and administrative matters pertaining to all schools. In order to do this they have one (1) enlisted man (PFC) on special duty with the AG section.
- (3) 77th Division - Division staff operating under T/O. The Adjutant General postal section has been increased by three (3) officers and ten (10) enlisted men.

2. Officers: -

a. Corps and division commanders were not greatly concerned regarding age of the regimental and battalion commanders. As long as they are physically fit and qualified to handle the job, they are acceptable.

b. There has not been an opportunity to observe the action of battle field appointed officers. This campaign is the first in which such officers have participated. From what little information I could obtain, they seemed to be satisfactory during early stages while I was an observer. All commanders are in favor of the policy. However, they object to the length of time required from time application is forwarded until final action is taken. This has been from one and one half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) to four (4) months. The XXIV Corps was unfortunate in that at the time the applications were forwarded covering the Leyte Campaign they were operating under the 6th Army, and before any action was taken the Corps was transferred to 10th Army under Pacific Ocean Area. All applications were returned without action as Corps was no longer under jurisdiction of South West Pacific Area. Upon submitting the applications to Pacific Ocean Area, it was found that the forms used were not in accordance with the theater requirements and were again returned for correction. The combining of the two theaters will undoubtedly prevent this ever happening again and by the recent order authorizing the corps commander to order the officer to active duty upon receipt of the appointment, the elapsed

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time before actually assuming the duties should be reduced. All commanders feel that there is a definite limitation on battle field appointments and that they will not be able to fulfill their replacement requirements in this manner.

c. The only objection to graduates from OCS shipped overseas direct upon graduation was made during a conference with General Randall, Assistant Commander, Colonel Crechter, Chief of Staff, and Lt. Colonel Manuel, G-1 of the 77th Division on 8 March 1945. They all agreed that officer replacements were being received who are totally lacking in proper instruction on infantry tactics and leadership. Upon questioning it was found that one such officer, 2nd Lieutenant P. Boyd Austin, 01329207, had just reported for duty. Upon questioning this officer, I found that he received his basic training at Fort Knox, upon completion was sent to the radio school there and after graduating was assigned to the 14th Armored Division, in January 1944. He left there in July to attend the 376th OCS at Fort Benning. Graduated from OCS on 19 December 1944 and sent to Replacement Depot #2. Was there five (5) days and sent to Fort Lawton where he remained twenty-four (24) days during which time he acted as information and education officer. From there was sent to 13th Replacement Depot and finally to the 77th Division where he arrived three (3) months after graduating from OCS.

Lieutenant Austin was a fine appearing officer, apparently in perfect physical condition and talked intelligently. I discussed this subject later with General Bruce and he stated that he was perfectly satisfied with the officer replacements he had received.

d. There has been no opportunity, so far, to observe infantry officers converted from other arms.

e. Divisions have always been short in officer personnel, particularly in company grades.

3. Warrant Officers: -

a. Warrant officers are used within the classification and for the particular jobs specified in tables of organization throughout the XXIV Corps.

b. All commanders are perfectly satisfied with the warrant officers received so far as rotational replacements and state that they compare very favorably with those already in the Theater.

c. The provisions of paragraph 11, AR610-15, dated 15 September 1944, are being complied with in the appointment of chief warrant officers. Due to some units having only two warrant officers assigned and authorized by T/O, such as field artillery and engineer battalions, warrant officer (jg) are recommended by seniority in this Command. However, not more than one chief warrant officer is authorized a battalion that has only two (2) warrant officers assigned. Forty percent (40%) of the warrant officers assigned are chief warrant officers. Those with an efficiency rating of below excellent are not considered for promotion to chief warrant officer.

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d. No definite information could be obtained regarding negro warrant officers.

4. Utilization of Man Power: -

a. Corps and division boards of officers were appointed consisting of classification officer, personnel consultant and a psychologist. These boards surveyed each unit to determine how many and in what positions class C men could be utilized. Readjustments were then made on basis of these board proceedings, so as to relieve physically qualified men from jobs which could be done by class C men. Consideration is given to grades and ratings, so that individuals will not have to be reduced and medical personnel have only been transferred on their own request.

b. There is no surplus of medical officers and all are assigned duties commensurate with their training. Medical administrative corps officers are used on T/O jobs and in some instances function as assistants to battalion and regimental surgeons on stereotyped treatments.

c. The physical profile is not used as a guide to proper assignment.

d. Psychoneurotic cases in this campaign have all been due to enemy artillery fire, as it is the first time our troops have been subjected to heavy artillery bombardment. Treatment requires them to be sent out of combat areas and they are being evacuated to Guam, then to Saipan or Oahu. The replacement training center at Schofield Barracks has a special training battalion for such cases. Here they are given a supervised course of training with the result that fifty (50) percent of the cases received have been sent back to duty with service units of which ninety (90%) percent have been reported satisfactory. There is no attempt to send psychoneurotic cases back to combat units.

e. Very few men over thirty-five (35) years of age have been received. If they are in good physical condition they are assigned according to their classification. However, if it appears the men may not make the grade in front line combat, they are assigned to a non-combatant unit. So far there has been no difficulty with enlisted personnel directly attributed to age.

5. Reclassification: -

All commanders consider reclassification procedure too involved and too slow. This also can be attributed to assignment of the XXIV Corps to various armies and theaters. While under jurisdiction of the old South Pacific Area, officers being reclassified were ordered to a replacement depot within four (4) days after papers were forwarded where he would wait pending final action. Under the policy of Pacific Ocean Area, officers remain with their organization and there is a lapse of two (2) months or more before any action is taken.

6. Pay: -

The amount of money needed to maintain a soldier is entirely dependant on where he is located within the theater. From my observation, I

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would say that twenty dollars (\$20.00) a month on Oahu, ten dollars (\$10.00) to fifteen dollars (\$15.00) on Guam and ten dollars (\$10.00) on Leyte and Okinawa is sufficient.

7. Personal Affairs: -

Particular attention has been paid to this subject by the XXIV Corps Commander. Two (2) weeks prior to my arrival the Commanding General gave a talk to all insurance officers down to companies. From records obtainable at Corps Headquarters, less than five hundred (500) out of a total of sixty-six thousand (66,000) are not insured. Over sixty thousand (60,000) have the maximum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000). Each regiment and separate unit has a special power of attorney and will officer and men are given every opportunity to make out their wills.

8. Promotion: -

a. Officer and non commissioned officer replacements have not retarded promotions.

b. A study of promotions as given by Brigadier General Townsend Hurd, G-1 of Pacific Ocean Area is shown in annex #3.

9. Replacement of Personnel: -

This is very involved in the Pacific Area and should be the subject of a special study after the new theater set up is worked out and operating. These remarks are based on information gathered from G-1, POA, Commanding General Replacement Training Center, Schofield Barracks and G-1, XXIV Corps.

The XXIV Corps was activated 8 April 1944 at Schofield Barracks, T.H., from sources available to Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area. The initial operation of the Corps was participation in a projected attack on the Palau Group conducted by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. This was changed to assign the XXIV Corps the mission of capturing Yap Island. Upon departure of the Corps from Pearl Harbor the objective of the XXIV Corps was again changed to Leyte, P.I., to be conducted by the Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific Area.

Upon embarking for the Okinawa Campaign the Corps was short approximately twenty five hundred (2,500) men and upon investigating the reason for this shortage, the following facts were uncovered:

a. Upon transferring the Corps from Pacific Ocean Area to the South West Pacific, it was with the understanding that battle casualties during Leyte Campaign would be replaced by South West Pacific Theater. On 25 December, the Corps received sixty-three (63) officers and one thousand nine-hundred and thirty eight (1,938) enlisted replacements from 6th Replacement Depot on New Caledonia. This shipment emptied the depot there and left the Corps one hundred forty (140) officers and two thousand four hundred and eighty five (2,485) enlisted men short from casualties received during Leyte campaign. As told me by the Commanding General, Replacement Training Center, Schofield Barracks,

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the Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific contacted the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area to see if the additional replacements could be furnished by Pacific Ocean Area. Upon contacting some member of his staff (identity unknown) Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area was informed there were six thousand (6,000) replacements on hand in the Pacific Ocean Area, where upon Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area guaranteed to make up the replacements. However, it was discovered later that forty-five hundred (4,500) of the six thousand (6,000) replacements had already been committed so that the XXIV Corps received only fifteen hundred (1500). This would not have been so bad as it meant only a nine-hundred (900) men shortage, but on the 1st of February, the XXIV Corps closed out their hospitals on Leyte preparatory to the move on Okinawa and made arrangements with other hospitals on Leyte under South West Pacific theater to handle their casualties. These hospitals had a five (5) day evacuation policy and were shipping patients to New Caledonia so that when it came time for the Corps to embark, it was discovered that many of their casualties that they had expected to be returned, had been shipped to rear areas.

There were five thousand (5000) replacements set up on Saipan for the Okinawa campaign and shipping made available so that they would arrive on the target at L+15 days. Casualties to include L+11 days within the XXIV Corps are as follows:

7th Division 96th Division Corps Troops Totals

KIA	161	254	36	451
WIA	750	1366	82	2198
MIA	14	218	9	241
NBC	399	466	139	1004
	1324	2304	266	3894

Of this total it was estimated that from fifteen hundred (1500) to two thousand (2,000) would be returned for duty within thirty (30) days so that added to the original shortage of two thousand four hundred and eighty five (2,485) the shortage would be on 1st May from four thousand three hundred (4,300) to four thousand eight hundred (4,800). These figures do not include the 77th Division which was under Army control or the 27th Division which joined the Corps on L+10 days.

The policy of sending replacements in during the assault is not very satisfactory. They cannot be put in the front line immediately, where ninety percent (90%) of the casualties occur and where replacements are needed, but must be given a period of indoctrination, usually through the buddy system in support and reserve units. It would be much more satisfactory if each infantry unit was authorized a ten percent (10%) overstrength initially. One battalion of replacements per division should also be authorized, this battalion to have four (4) companies, three (3) of which would be infantry and one (1) spare parts. These battalions would accompany the division and could be used initially on beach duty, beach defense and military police duty.

A study of availability of replacements in the Pacific Ocean Area theater does not disclose any shortage of ground force personnel. The replacement status and requirements is prepared by the Replacement Training

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Center of Pacific Ocean Area as of 2 April 1945 (annex #4) shows that on 1 April 1945 there was on hand a surplus of five thousand two hundred and sixty two (5,262) infantry men. There is, however, a distinct shortage of service troops, and to overcome this shortage, it was necessary to convert the following combat units to service units in the Pacific Ocean Area:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Actual Number Men</u>	<u>Transferred</u>
Hq & Hq. Company, Armored Group		102
2 - Tank Battalions		1379
2 - Hq. & Hq. Batteries, Harbor Defense		626
2 - Hq. & Hq. Batteries, CA Group		172
3 - Hq. & Hq. Batteries, CA Battalions		160
13 - CA Batteries, Harbor Defense		2281
102d Infantry Regiment (less 1 battalion)		1944
298th Infantry Regiment (less 1 battalion)		2366
2 - Tank Destroyer Battalions		1232
	Total	10,262

It takes approximately seventy (70) days from the time the requisition is submitted until the replacement arrives in the Pacific Ocean Area theater. The average time of replacements remaining in replacement training centers and replacement depots within theater before joining a unit is 58.9 days, including travel time.

Replacements for Pacific Ocean Area are all received by Headquarters Replacement Training Command, Pacific Ocean Area, at Schofield Barracks. Upon arrival they are profiled, classified and put into training for from two (2) to four (4) weeks. The course of training consists of firing record course with principle weapons and familiarization of other arms, jungle warfare, small unit combat and amphibious training.

They have been very satisfied with the type of replacements received from the States. Their basic training is satisfactory and very few changes are necessary in classification and profile.

10. Military Government: -

The XXIV Corps had the following Military-Government Teams:

Three (3) A Teams
Five (5) B Teams
Two (2) C Teams
One (1) G-6 Hospital
Nine (9) G-10 Dispensaries

From these the 7th, 77th and 96th Divisions were each given one (1) A team, one (1) B team and two (2) G-10 dispensaries. These teams are organized and equipped sufficiently to perform the duties assigned. The A team accompanies forward elements of the division and is supposed to locate civi-

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lians and supplies and funnel them back to the B team. The division B team establishes temporary civilian enclosures and is relieved by the corps B team as the division moves forward. The A team is composed of four (4) officers including one (1) medical, one (1) engineer and one (1) public safety officer and eight (8) enlisted men including two (2) interpreters. They have one (1) jeep and one (1) - 3/4 ton truck. There is no need for a qualified engineer officer on this team as any officer could perform the duties required; two (2) interpreters are not enough as civilians are scattered and have to be rounded up. The transportation is inadequate as the team itself must operate its own camp, haul its own supplies and equipment besides gathering in civilians and civilian food.

The B team is composed of eight (8) officers and nineteen (19) enlisted men with two (2) jeeps and one (1) - 3/4 ton truck. Two (2) of the officers are classified as a legal officer and an economic and industrial officer. They do not function in such capacity and their specialty is not needed on this team.

The C teams is composed of ten (10) officers and twenty-seven (27) enlisted men with three (3) jeeps, one (1) - 3/4 ton truck and one (1) - 1½ ton truck. Their function is to establish permanent civilian camps and evacuate civilians from the B enclosure to the permanent camp. The personnel seems to be adequate but the transportation should be increased.

There is no organized plan or policy for gathering local food and supplies, and with the lack of transportation this developed into a serious problem.

Combat commanders are held responsible for the control of civilians within their area. However, there seems to be a lack of understanding between the Military Government Section and the combat forces regarding transportation. On amphibious operations shipping space is always at a premium and the Military Government feels that if transportation is not shipped in for their specific use it is the responsibility of the combat commander to furnish it for them. During the early phases of an invasion the combat commander is primarily interested in getting his supplies and equipment needed by the combat troops forward and feels that it is the responsibility of the Military Government teams to accomplish their task with the equipment and transportation as set up by the Military Government Section.

The personnel assigned by the Military Government for collecting and handling civilians and supplies is entirely inadequate so that combat commanders are required to furnish military police and other troops to assist in this work.

11. Recommendations: -

a. Changes in Tables of Organization.

- (1) That the corps staff for amphibious operations be increased by twenty-five percent (25%) over present T/O to include the same proportion of all grades and ratings in both commissioned and enlisted personnel.

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- (2) That a military police battalion, T/O & E 19-35 be assigned to the corps.
- (3) That a casual company be authorized as organic part of corps along line shown in annex #5.
- (4) That a headquarters and headquarters company, special troops be authorized as part of the corps as shown in annex #6.

b. Officers:

- (1) That authority to approve battlefield appointments be given to corps commanders with the authority to delegate such action to the division commanders when circumstances warrant.

c. Replacements:

- (1) That infantry combat units be authorized a 10% over-strength (including lieutenants) initially when entering upon an amphibious campaign.
- (2) That a replacement battalion be organized for each division participating in the campaign.
- (3) That battle field replacements arrive during the mopping up period. This would allow replacements to get actual combat experience without the added risk involved during an assault, would give them unit morale and would prepare them to accompany the assault waves on subsequent invasions.

d. Military Government Teams:

- (1) A Team - That the engineer officer on the A team be an officer branch immaterial. That the enlisted personnel be increased by two (2) interpreters and three (3) drivers and that three (3) trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton be allotted.
- (2) B Team - That branch immaterial officers be substituted for the legal officer and economic and industrial officer on the B team and that the enlisted personnel be increased by one (1) driver for an additonal $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck.
- (3) C Team - That a salvage section be added to each C team. This section to consist of one (1) officer, one (1) tech. sergeant, two (2) privates, and one (1) staff sergeant and three (3) privates for each division. The duty of this section would be to collect, store and issue to civilian camps necessary food and supplies gathered from local sources. The T/Sgt and two (2) privates would maintain warehouses or stock piles and make necessary issues.

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The T/Sgt and three (3) privates would collect the supplies

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The 6/Sgt and three (3) privates would collect the supplies by working in conjunction with the A teams and deliver them to the warehouse or stock pile. This section should be allotted two (2) jeeps for warehouse detail and one (1) jeep and one (1) -2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck for each division detail.

(4) That an officer of the Military Government be assigned to the G-1 section of army ground forces as a liaison officer and coordinator between the army ground forces and military government section of the War Department.

Section III - G-2 Activities

1. Organization of G-2 Section.

a. The XXIV Corps G-2 Section is authorized ~~nine~~ ^{seven} (7) officers, one (1) warrant officer and nine (9) enlisted men under augmented T/O under which the corps staff functions (see inclosure #1). In addition to this, the section has two (2) additional officers on special duty. Chart of the G-2 section shown by inclosure #7.

b. For the Okinawa Campaign the following teams have been attached to the G-2 section: two (2) photo interpreters, one (1) Japanese order of battle, two (2) language, one (1) counter intelligence corps.

c. The operations section is broken down into two (2) teams as follows:

1st Team

2nd Team

Officers	Enlisted Men	Officers	Enlisted Men
Lt. Colonel	Master Sergeant	Major	T/4-Draftsman
Major	T/3 Draftsman	Captain	T/4-Typist
Captain	T/3 Stenographer	1st Lt.	
	T/5 Draftsman		

The first team is relieved by second team for meals and during hours 2400 - 0800. It has been found that the peak load comes between 1800-2400 and all officers are required to be on duty during those hours.

The break-down of the entire section into teams working an 8 or 12 hour shift is not considered logical. The break down should be by tasks and not by hours. For instance, the photo interpretation team must work as a unit in order to check each other to insure proper and thorough results. If teams were divided into shifts it would mean individual interpretation.

2. Interpretation of Aerial Photographs.

a. There are two (2) aerial photograph interpretation teams with the G-2 Section of the XXIV Corps and three (3) teams in the corps artillery section. Each Team consists of one (1) officer and four (4) enlisted men. A team works on one task at a time, each individually studying a photo, and by

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consultation, exchange of opinions and discussion, a more accurate solution is obtained.

b. There were no vectographs available.

3. Maps: -

a. Photo Maps:-

Requests for aerial photo maps are made to army. The mission is flown by the 64th Topographical Group. There is within the corps a topographical detachment for survey and reproduction.

b. Ordinary Maps:-

Maps are secured by requisition on the 10th Army. Distribution is made by the engineer under G-2 supervision. The distribution section is composed of one (1) officer (also acts as G-2 of corps engineer section) and four (4) enlisted men from the Engineer Depot Company. This seems to work satisfactorily, and no special unit for map distribution is believed necessary.

c. Prior to invasion the following maps were available covering the beach area:

(1) Aerial Photographs:

Western Okinawa Beaches - prepared by COM-PHIB, Group 12 and PHIB-SPAC Intelligence.

(2) Ordinary Map:

Okinawa Shima - prepared by Engineer Section, Fleet Marine Force, PAC.

d. A reserve stock of maps is carried by the Corps based on a three (3) weeks supply. This is to tide over until the 10th Army is set up on the target which was estimated to be L/15.

e. Chart showing map distribution is shown in annex #8.

4. Reconnaissance: -

a. At present there is no agency available to the corps commanders for special ground and/or water reconnaissance. The need for some such agency was almost constant. The only solution was to rob divisions of reconnaissance troops or to make provisional reconnaissance units from combat troops. In amphibious operations of the nature in which troops in this area are now engaged, it is deemed essential that there be set up some type of amphibious reconnaissance unit for corps and higher commands. Such an organization is essential when invading large land masses and particularly on the Japanese mainland.

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b. Normally in landing our troops the reconnaissance troop of the division is not counted on for mounted reconnaissance until after the beachhead has been secured and the advance inland started. Therefore, vehicles belonging to these troops are not loaded out to land until after the regimental combat teams are unloaded. Due to the unexpected light resistance to our landing on Okinawa, the assault troops were able to advance rapidly and had reached the east coast of the island before the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop had been unloaded. However, when the advance to the south started, both reconnaissance troops were sent forward and did excellent work in locating and determining the enemy position.

c. In the 7th Division the reconnaissance platoon is composed of ~~five~~^{ten} (10) vehicles:-

4.5 JACPS

2 Weasels

2 M-8's

1 Half Track

By putting a half track in each platoon, they are able to save many vehicles which had been mired down or in a ditch.

It has also been the practice in this Division to instruct all men in the reconnaissance troop as forward artillery observers. A 193 radio set from the troop is left at the artillery command post and in this way they have been able to direct artillery fire on strong points, artillery positions etc.

A 3/4 ton truck has been added to the reconnaissance troop for radio maintenance.

d. In the 96th Division Reconnaissance Troop they have installed in each jeep a low tripod for a machine gun to be used by the man in the front seat. They have also welded a track on the M8 to have an all around traverse without moving the turret. A periscope which is handled by hand is in each M8 to allow occupants to look around before exposing themselves.

5. Propaganda: -

a. Results of propaganda are not considered commensurate with the effort expended. Statements from Japanese prisoners indicate that we have not reached a satisfactory goal in designing our propaganda. It is believed that additional study of this subject is needed with a view towards preparation of leaflets more effective in their appeal to the Japanese.

b. Distribution of propaganda leaflets is accomplished by dropping from planes and by shell. Little or no effect was obtained.

6. Language Teams: -

a. XXIV Corps:

There were two (2) language teams attached to the Corps from Pacific Ocean Area. Each team consists of one (1) officer and ten (10) enlisted

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men. The team is broken down into three (3) sections as follows:

Interrogation Section
Translation Section
Clerical Section

The majority of the enlisted personnel were not very well educated. Most of them had only a high school education and only one had a two years college background. This put a heavy burden on the officers to check over and rewrite most of the material. None of them were typists so that the time of getting out reports was longer than necessary. These teams should be increased by one officer, so that there would be an officer in each interrogation and translation section, and two (2) enlisted qualified typists not necessarily with a knowledge of the Japanese language.

b. Divisions: -

One language team is assigned to each division. From these the division sends two (2) enlisted men to each regiment which leaves only one (1) officer and four (4) enlisted men with the division and none forward of the regiment.

c. Procedure: -

The present procedure is to send prisoners back to the regimental command post where they are questioned by members of the language teams from the division. This is a short question period based on tactical questions involving the immediate front, i.e., identification, strength of unit, location of supporting weapons, etc. The time a prisoner is held at the regimental command post is dependent on available transportation to send him to the rear, but it is rarely over two (2) hours. At the division command post the prisoner is given a more general questioning and then sent back to the corps. Prisoners are generally under corps control within twenty four (24) hours after capture. The questioning at corps command post is very thorough and covers subjects as shown in annex #9.

d. This procedure means that the battalion commander who captured the prisoner will not receive information gained from him until it is relayed forward from regiment. This may mean anywhere from two (2) to four (4) hours or more and the loss of opportunity to act quickly on information gained. This could be remedied by attaching a language team of eight (8) enlisted men to each regiment. If this was done each battalion could be given two (2) men who would be able to question prisoners on the spot, thus gaining any valuable information immediately. They would also be of great assistance to the battalion commander in reading road signs, interrogating inhabitants, etc. The battalion commanders would have to realize the position these forward interpreters are placed in and take measures to give them necessary protection.

7. Intelligence Information Prior to Landing: -

a. The G-2 Summary No. 1 of XXIV Corps dated 10 February 1945 (copy

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turned over to G-2, AGF) in time to give information of the enemy and the terrain relating to the landing on Okinawa. Subsequent information gained after landing shows it to be very accurate.

b. The only ground reconnaissance made prior to landing was conducted by the Underwater Demolition Teams of the Amphibious Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The Operation Plan covering these teams has been turned into G-2 Section, AGF, and will not be incorporated in this report.

c. Three underwater demolition teams were assigned to cover the beaches over which the XXIV Corps was to land. Reconnaissance was made on L-4 day and the remaining days were employed to clear the approaches to the beaches. Poles driven in the beaches which would be covered during high tide were the only obstructions found and these were easily removed.

d. Reconnaissance and liaison officers from the combat units were attached to the underwater demolition teams on following basis:

8 officers - 1 per each Battalion Landing Team in assault.
4 officers - 1 per each regiment in the assault.
2 officers - 1 per each division
1 officer - from Corps G-2 Section

These liaison officers left the attack area on L-2 days and met the convoy carrying parent unit on L-1 day and acquainted respective commanders with all available information concerning his battalion's beach.

8. Summary: -

a. The operation of the G-2 section, XXIV Corps was exceptionally good. The section was well organized with the executive officer responsible for the functioning of the groups (see annex #10). This left the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 free for consultation with other staff officers and for visits to lower echelons. The flow of information was very good and the situation map was always up to date. It took all the time of one officer from the operation section to handle the large number of civilian correspondents accompanying the Corps. He had to arrange transportation for them, coordinate their visits, keep them posted on the situation and edit their reports.

9. Recommendations: -

a. The G-2 section of the corps should be increased by two (2) officers above the augmented T/O as shown by annex #1a. One (1) is needed to handle visiting correspondents and the other in the operations section.

b. The public relations section should come directly under the control of the chief of staff and not under G-2 section. It should be an organic part of the corps staff and include:

Personnel - One (1) Major, Branch Immaterial, - Public Relations Officer

One (1) Sergeant - Copy and assignment chief.

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Two (2) T/4's - Reporters and rewrite men.
One (1) T/4 - Photographer
One (1) T/5 - Clerk

Equipment: - Two (2) typewriters (one standard, one portable)
One (1) camera, speed graphic (4 X 5)
One (1) camera, 35 mm
Necessary photographic supplies.

c. That a corps set up for amphibious operations have assigned as a permanent part of it's corps troops, one amphibious reconnaissance squadron, similar in nature to the present cavalry reconnaissance squadron modified suitably for amphibious operations.

d. That a language team of eight (8) enlisted men be assigned to each assault regiment.

Section IV - Miscellaneous

1. Cub Planes: -

Light liaison planes are urgently needed for reconnaissance and command missions. The artillery liaison planes, despite frequent bad flying weather, did an excellent job of visual reconnaissance. However, these planes cannot function in a dual capacity and the number now authorized is only sufficient for artillery needs. There are innumerable uses for additional light planes, i.e., supply of isolated units when other planes are not available (organic artillery planes were actually used for this purpose on Leyte, especially by the 11th Airborne Division when the 5th Air Force planes were not available); evacuation of wounded, reconnaissance; command purposes; transmission of messages and many others. Attempts to use K-20 cameras from these planes produced only fair results. Additional planes of this type could be maintained by the corps artillery with only a slight increase in maintenance personnel, however, they should be marked for command purposes and independent of corps artillery. The additional pilots should be artillery pilots so that their use could be flexible.

Each corps should be furnished a squadron of eight (8) liaison planes, four (4) of which should be of the L-5 type.

2. Allotment of Shipping Space: -

Considerable difficulty has been experienced in loading out of corps units for the assault due to shipping assignments. In loading out for the assault and unloading at the target our current amphibious doctrine does not take into account the corps troops. It is designed to handle troops up to and including the division. Corps shipping is dependent on what ships the Navy furnishes which is never enough. This means that in many cases some shipping space has to be taken away from the divisions and in all cases some equipment must be left behind.

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furnishes which is never enough. This means that in many cases some shipping space has to be taken away from the divisions and in all cases some equipment must be left behind.

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There is no question but that the Army and Navy restudy of this matter should be made with a view to making some provision for definite shipping units for corps and army troops in large amphibious operations.

3. Relieving Combat Troops of Personnel on Special Duty: -

Every effort should be made to eliminate the necessity to rob combat troops of personnel in order to handle rear echelon installations. This particularly applies to the need of always furnishing additional military police, both for traffic control and handling of civilians, and for the proper functioning of the corps command post due to attached personnel. This can be done by authorizing a headquarters, special troop for the corps as outlined in inclosures #5 and #6 and by either assigning a military police battalion to each C team of the military government or by increasing the corps troops by that much.

4. Tactics and Training: -

Tactics used by troops of the XXIV Corps and results obtained completely justify our tactical teaching as applied to combat. It has been found that the Japanese is probably more susceptible to flanking and turning movements than other troops. It is believed that our troops should be well indoctrinated with the principles of maneuver, including operations of small units, and with the sound principles of open warfare. More emphasis should be placed on the training of the individual soldier and small units, particular attention being paid to use of individual weapons, patrolling, use of cover and concealment, and use of maneuver by small units in the offensive.

W. N. Todd, Jr.
W. N. TODD, Jr.
Colonel, Cavalry

List of Annex's:

- Annex No. 1 - Augmented Corps Staff T/O
- Annex No. 2 - Organization of a Casual Detachment
- Annex No. 3 - Study in Promotion in POA.
- Annex No. 4 - Replacement Status and Requirement, POA
- Annex No. 5 - Proposed T/O for Corps Casual Detachment
- Annex No. 6 - Proposed T/O for Corps Hq. & Hq. Company, Special Troops.
- Annex No. 7 - Operational Chart, G-2 Section, XXIV Corps
- Annex No. 8 - Chart showing map distribution.
- Annex No. 9 - Method of interrogation of prisoners
- Annex No. 10 - Duties of Executive Officer, G-2 Section, XXIV Corps.

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Grade or Rank	CG & Aides	S/2	S/3	S/4	S/5	S/6	S/7	S/8	S/9	S/10	S/11	S/12	S/13	S/14	S/15	S/16	S/17	S/18	S/19	S/20	S/21	S/22	S/23	S/24	S/25	S/26	S/27	S/28	S/29	S/30	S/31	S/32	S/33	S/34	S/35	S/36	S/37	S/38	S/39	S/40	S/41	S/42	S/43	S/44	S/45	S/46	S/47	S/48	S/49	S/50	S/51	S/52	S/53	S/54	S/55	S/56	S/57	S/58	S/59	S/60	S/61	S/62	S/63	S/64	S/65	S/66	S/67	S/68	S/69	S/70	S/71	S/72	S/73	S/74	S/75	S/76	S/77	S/78	S/79	S/80	S/81	S/82	S/83	S/84	S/85	S/86	S/87	S/88	S/89	S/90	S/91	S/92	S/93	S/94	S/95	S/96	S/97	S/98	S/99	S/100	S/101	S/102	S/103	S/104	S/105	S/106	S/107	S/108	S/109	S/110	S/111	S/112	S/113	S/114	S/115	S/116	S/117	S/118	S/119	S/120	S/121	S/122	S/123	S/124	S/125	S/126	S/127	S/128	S/129	S/130	S/131	S/132	S/133	S/134	S/135	S/136	S/137	S/138	S/139	S/140	S/141	S/142	S/143	S/144	S/145	S/146	S/147	S/148	S/149	S/150	S/151	S/152	S/153	S/154	S/155	S/156	S/157	S/158	S/159	S/160	S/161	S/162	S/163	S/164	S/165	S/166	S/167	S/168	S/169	S/170	S/171	S/172	S/173	S/174	S/175	S/176	S/177	S/178	S/179	S/180	S/181	S/182	S/183	S/184	S/185	S/186	S/187	S/188	S/189	S/190	S/191	S/192	S/193	S/194	S/195	S/196	S/197	S/198	S/199	S/200	S/201	S/202	S/203	S/204	S/205	S/206	S/207	S/208	S/209	S/210	S/211	S/212	S/213	S/214	S/215	S/216	S/217	S/218	S/219	S/220	S/221	S/222	S/223	S/224	S/225	S/226	S/227	S/228	S/229	S/230	S/231	S/232	S/233	S/234	S/235	S/236	S/237	S/238	S/239	S/240	S/241	S/242	S/243	S/244	S/245	S/246	S/247	S/248	S/249	S/250	S/251	S/252	S/253	S/254	S/255	S/256	S/257	S/258	S/259	S/260	S/261	S/262	S/263	S/264	S/265	S/266	S/267	S/268	S/269	S/270	S/271	S/272	S/273	S/274	S/275	S/276	S/277	S/278	S/279	S/280	S/281	S/282	S/283	S/284	S/285	S/286	S/287	S/288	S/289	S/290	S/291	S/292	S/293	S/294	S/295	S/296	S/297	S/298	S/299	S/300	S/301	S/302	S/303	S/304	S/305	S/306	S/307	S/308	S/309	S/310	S/311	S/312	S/313	S/314	S/315	S/316	S/317	S/318	S/319	S/320	S/321	S/322	S/323	S/324	S/325	S/326	S/327	S/328	S/329	S/330	S/331	S/332	S/333	S/334	S/335	S/336	S/337	S/338	S/339	S/340	S/341	S/342	S/343	S/344	S/345	S/346	S/347	S/348	S/349	S/350	S/351	S/352	S/353	S/354	S/355	S/356	S/357	S/358	S/359	S/360	S/361	S/362	S/363	S/364	S/365	S/366	S/367	S/368	S/369	S/370	S/371	S/372	S/373	S/374	S/375	S/376	S/377	S/378	S/379	S/380	S/381	S/382	S/383	S/384	S/385	S/386	S/387	S/388	S/389	S/390	S/391	S/392	S/393	S/394	S/395	S/396	S/397	S/398	S/399	S/400	S/401	S/402	S/403	S/404	S/405	S/406	S/407	S/408	S/409	S/410	S/411	S/412	S/413	S/414	S/415	S/416	S/417	S/418	S/419	S/420	S/421	S/422	S/423	S/424	S/425	S/426	S/427	S/428	S/429	S/430	S/431	S/432	S/433	S/434	S/435	S/436	S/437	S/438	S/439	S/440	S/441	S/442	S/443	S/444	S/445	S/446	S/447	S/448	S/449	S/450	S/451	S/452	S/453	S/454	S/455	S/456	S/457	S/458	S/459	S/460	S/461	S/462	S/463	S/464	S/465	S/466	S/467	S/468	S/469	S/470	S/471	S/472	S/473	S/474	S/475	S/476	S/477	S/478	S/479	S/480	S/481	S/482	S/483	S/484	S/485	S/486	S/487	S/488	S/489	S/490	S/491	S/492	S/493	S/494	S/495	S/496	S/497	S/498	S/499	S/500	S/501	S/502	S/503	S/504	S/505	S/506	S/507	S/508	S/509	S/510	S/511	S/512	S/513	S/514	S/515	S/516	S/517	S/518	S/519	S/520	S/521	S/522	S/523	S/524	S/525	S/526	S/527	S/528	S/529	S/530	S/531	S/532	S/533	S/534	S/535	S/536	S/537	S/538	S/539	S/540	S/541	S/542	S/543	S/544	S/545	S/546	S/547	S/548	S/549	S/550	S/551	S/552	S/553	S/554	S/555	S/556	S/557	S/558	S/559	S/560	S/561	S/562	S/563	S/564	S/565	S/566	S/567	S/568	S/569	S/570	S/571	S/572	S/573	S/574	S/575	S/576	S/577	S/578	S/579	S/580	S/581	S/582	S/583	S/584	S/585	S/586	S/587	S/588	S/589	S/590	S/591	S/592	S/593	S/594	S/595	S/596	S/597	S/598	S/599	S/600	S/601	S/602	S/603	S/604	S/605	S/606	S/607	S/608	S/609	S/610	S/611	S/612	S/613	S/614	S/615	S/616	S/617	S/618	S/619	S/620	S/621	S/622	S/623	S/624	S/625	S/626	S/627	S/628	S/629	S/630	S/631	S/632	S/633	S/634	S/635	S/636	S/637	S/638	S/639	S/640	S/641	S/642	S/643	S/644	S/645	S/646	S/647	S/648	S/649	S/650	S/651	S/652	S/653	S/654	S/655	S/656	S/657	S/658	S/659	S/660	S/661	S/662	S/663	S/664	S/665	S/666	S/667	S/668	S/669	S/670	S/671	S/672	S/673	S/674	S/675	S/676	S/677	S/678	S/679	S/680	S/681	S/682	S/683	S/684	S/685	S/686	S/687	S/688	S/689	S/690	S/691	S/692	S/693	S/694	S/695	S/696	S/697	S/698	S/699	S/700	S/701	S/702	S/703	S/704	S/705	S/706	S/707	S/708	S/709	S/710	S/711	S/712	S/713	S/714	S/715	S/716	S/717	S/718	S/719	S/720	S/721	S/722	S/723	S/724	S/725	S/726	S/727	S/728	S/729	S/730	S/731	S/732	S/733	S/734	S/735	S/736	S/737	S/738	S/739	S/740	S/741	S/742	S/743	S/744	S/745	S/746	S/747	S/748	S/749	S/750	S/751	S/752	S/753	S/754	S/755	S/756	S/757	S/758	S/759	S/760	S/761	S/762	S/763	S/764	S/765	S/766	S/767	S/768	S/769	S/770	S/771	S/772	S/773	S/774	S/775	S/776	S/777	S/778	S/779	S/780	S/781	S/782	S/783	S/784	S/785	S/786	S/787	S/788	S/789	S/790	S/791	S/792	S/793	S/794	S/795	S/796	S/797	S/798	S/799	S/800	S/801	S/802	S/803	S/804	S/805	S/806	S/807	S/808	S/809	S/810	S/811	S/812	S/813	S/814	S/815	S/816	S/817	S/818	S/819	S/820	S/821	S/822	S/823	S/824	S/825	S/826	S/827	S/828	S/829	S/830	S/831	S/832	S/833	S/834	S/835	S/836	S/837	S/838	S/839	S/840	S/841	S/842	S/843	S/844	S/845	S/846	S/847	S/848	S/849	S/850	S/851	S/852	S/853	S/854	S/855	S/856	S/857	S/858	S/859	S/860	S/861	S/862	S/863	S/864	S/865	S/866	S/867	S/868

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS

APO 235

TFAGD 320.2

23 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

TO : Commanding Officer, 20th Armored Gp, APO 235.

1. The 20th Armored Group will provide the necessary personnel and equipment to establish and operate a casual camp on the target. The camp will be in operation not later than L + 7, and will perform the following functions.

a. Contact all Corps and Army hospitals on the target and arrange to relieve them of all XXIV Corps patients who are ready to be returned to duty. Check all casualties entering the camp for physical fitness to return to duty.

b. Shelter, feed, and house all casualties who are returning to organizations of the XXIV Corps.

c. Make direct arrangements with units concerned for the delivery of their casualties.

d. Equip all casualties passing through the camp in accordance with Inclosure #2 to Administrative Memorandum 1-45, Headquarters, XXIV Corps. 10 February 1945.

e. Maintain a record of all casualties processed by the camp, showing for each casualty:

- (1) Name, rank, ASN, organization.
- (2) Date and hour of arrival.
- (3) Installation where last housed.
- (4) Date and hour of delivery.
- (5) To whom delivered.

f. Report each week by 1200, Sunday, as of midnight Saturday, number of casualties processed, by organization.

2. A suggested T/O & E is attached (Incl #1). Organization property may be requisitioned from G-4, XXIV Corps.

By command of Major General HODGE:

W. H. BIGGERSTAFF
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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A study of promotions in Pacific Ocean Area as of 1 September 1944 shows that there are:

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178 Colonels - 19 - 11 - 34 - 38 - 28 - 40 - 4 - 2 - 1 - 1
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4 - $5\frac{1}{2}$ - $6\frac{1}{2}$

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for Colonels is two (2) years one (1) month.

619 Lt. Colonels - 129 - 88 - 192 - 116 - 52 - 12 - 12 - 18
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for Lt. Colonel is one (1) year, six (6) months.

1185 Majors - 299 - 291 - 352 - 137 - 76 - 12 - 14 - 3 - 1
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4 - $4\frac{1}{2}$

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for Major is one (1) year three (3) months.

4148 Captains - 1029 - 1110 - 1043 - 630 - 248 - 43 - 30 - 12 - 3
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4 - $4\frac{1}{2}$

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grades for Captains is one (1) year, three (3) months.

5523 1st Lt. - 1823 - 1569 - 1414 - 487 - 149 - 37 - 32 - 12
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3 - $3\frac{1}{2}$ - 4

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for 1st Lieutenants is one (1) year, one (1) month.

4523 2nd Lts. - 328 - 1281 - 1980 - 868 - 66
 Years in Grade - $\frac{1}{2}$ - 1 - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 - $2\frac{1}{2}$

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for 2nd Lieutenants is one (1) year, four (4) months.

An individual study was made on each officer having served more than following years in grade:

3 years for Colonel

$2\frac{1}{2}$ years for all other grades

with view to create an opportunity for promotion where promotion is warranted or in case of substandard performance of duty, to recommend reassignment, reclassification, demotion or separation as the case might warrant. This resulted in the reclassification of five (5) officers and the reassignment of eight (8) officers. Promotions could not be made in every case - however, the officers knew that their case was being studied and considered which helps morale.

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During 1944 the following promotions were made:

47 Lt. Colonels to Colonels
267 Majors to Lt. Colonels
653 Captains to Majors
1553 - 1st Lieutenants to Captains
2631 - 2nd Lieutenants to 1st Lieutenants

The monthly promotion totals in all grades show numerical increases over the year, particularly as a result of battlefield appointments and the eighteen (18) months promotion in company grades. It is doubtful, however, if these increases will keep pace with the growing officer strength in the theater and that a longer time in grade will undoubtedly be shown in 1945.

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STATUS - POA

	AAF	Armd	Cav.	CAC	Fa	Inf	TD	CITS	CE	OMF	ID	BI	Ord	QMC	Sig C.	TC
Replacements on Hand																
31 March	483	605	185	573	--	659	12787	--	59	597	66	636	724	256	438	239
Commitments -																
Unit Requisitions	5	121	11	697	92	168	1268	36	114	152	134	856	1096	2143	205	660
XXIV Corps	1	97	12	103		228	2099	24	182	262	28	16	49	147	82	
Desired (Depot Stock)	570	299	26	398		457	4158	24	39	638	73	457	313	193	311	180
Total	576	516	49	1198	92	853	7525	60	177	1072	209	1575	1320	1304	2503	922
Net Surplus Deficit	-93	489	436	-625	-92	-194	45362	-60	-118	-475	-143	-939	-596	-199	-2065	-733
April																
Gains: -																
From Z1		1869														
* From W.D. Det. Patients	190	12	1	51	3	203	3	60	56	482	4	279	1130	78	941	23
Losses	591	529	42	370	67	19	101	3	6	62	11	69	199	37	59	33
Net Gains or Loss	-1168	-517	-41	-116	-54	-372	-3916	-14	-11	1466	86	550	252	203	276	313
Replacement Status										-922	-71	-220	1077	624	724	-257
30 April	41375	-428	495	-741	-116	-566	41346	-74	-129	-397	-214	-1159	481	-1326	-1311	-584
May																
Gains: -																
From Z-1		2508	465	--	--	292	3310	161	133	19	14	357	268	663	206	159
* From WD, Det. Patients	183	58	4	69	10	62	320	3	15	138	17	101	301	53	76	67
Losses	502	188	13	280	61	263	1046	17	40	390	53	315	833	193	239	181
Net Gain or Loss	2189	325	-9	-211	-51	91	2584	147	108	-233	-22	153	264	523	43	45
Replacement Status																
31 May	3564	-93	484	-952	-197	-475	3930	73	-21	-160	-236	-106	217	-805	-1298	-539
June																
Gains: -																
From Z1																
* From WD, Det. Patients	500	305	--	10	--	160	2600	--	--	60	--	20	174	261	80	145
Losses	195	111	9	87	12	103	688	2	21	225	21	161	499	69	94	70
Net Gain or Loss	486	127	9	247	59	185	990	17	32	303	43	264	586	174	222	135
Replacement Status	109	289	--	-150	-47	78	2298	-15	-8	-18	-22	-81	-87	69	133	50
30 June	3673	196	84	-1102	-214	-397	6228	58	-29	-1648	-258	-1087	130	-736	1165	-489

ANNEX #4

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	Inf	Armd	Cav.	CAC	CAC	Inf	Inf	CMP	MD	BI	Ord	QMC	Sig
	AA	AA	HD										
Gains: -													
From Z1	500	160	---	110	---	210	3500	---	60	---	70	174	261
*From WD Det. Patients	178	69	6	65	10	67	435	3	17	165	18	122	383
Losses	502	183	12	257	58	211	1514	17	35	317	40	257	184
Net Gains or Losses	176	46	-6	-82	-48	66	2421	-14	-18	-92	-22	-65	199
Replacement Status	3849	242	78	-1184	-292	-331	8649	44	-47	-1740-280-1152	329	-662-1038	-458
31 July													
Gains: -													
From Z1	500	210	52	110	---	130	4100	55	---	210	---	70	174
* From WD Det. Patients	143	44	4	43	9	41	372	3	12	119	13	93	320
Losses	502	99	6	248	58	232	646	17	25	290	40	230	184
Net Gains or Losses	141	155	50	-95	-48	-61	3826	41	-13	39	-27	-67	146
Replacement Status	3990	397	128	-1279	-340	-392	12475	85	-60-1741	-307-129	475	-600	-927
31 August													
Gains: -													
From Z1	500	160	---	110	---	280	3100	---	160	---	120	---	174
*From WD Det. Patients	133	28	3	35	8	31	264	3	10	86	11	70	265
Losses	2003	914	240	492	101	730	7977	174	131	1842	83	885	233
Net Gains or Losses	-1370	-726	-237	-347	-93	-419	-4612	-171-121-1596	-72-695	32	-114	-239	-241
Replacement Status	2620	-329	-109	-1626	-433	-811	7863	-86-181-3297	-379-1914	507	-714-1166	-691	-
31 September													

*Based on letter from War Department.

ANNEX #4

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Provisional Casual Camp Headquarters

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1.	UNIT	Specifi- cation Serial Number	Tech- nician Grade	Casual Camp Head- quarters
2.	1st Lt. Adjutant	2110		1
3.	2nd Lt Mess, Adm, Supply	4113		1
4.	Total Commissioned			2
5.	1st Sgt	585		1
6.	S Sgt, including			4
7.	Mess	824		(1)
8.	Supply	821		(1)
9.	Platoon	651		(2)
10.	Corporal			1
11.	Company Clerk	813		(1)
12.	Technician Grade 4			2
13.	Technician Grade 5			6
14.	Private First Class, including			2
15.	Private			3
16.	Carpenter	050	5	(1)
17.	Clerk Typist	405	5	(1)
18.	Cook	060	4	(2)
19.	Cook	060	5	(2)
20.	Cook's Helper	521		(3)
21.	Mechanic, Automobile	014	5	(1)
22.	Medical Technician	409	5	(1)
23.	Truck Driver, Light	345		(2)
24.	Total Enlisted			19
25.	Aggregate			21

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ANNEX #5

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MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO BE PROVIDED

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HEADQUARTERS C.I.I. TROOPS (Corps)

1 Lt. Colonel, C.O. 2 M/S, Chief of Section
1 Major, Executive Officer 1 T/Sgt, Billeting Section &
1 Captain, S-2 and S-3 2 S/Sgt. Asst. Provost Sgt.
1 Captain, S1 & 4 2 T/3 - Clerks Stenographers
2 1st Lt. Asst't S-4 & Billeting Officer 2 T/4 - Clerks-Typists
2 Cpl - Supply
5 T/5 - Clerk Typists
16 Enlisted Men

6 Officers

Headquarters Co.

Attached Units

Casual Co.

Q.M. Service Pl.

Q.M. Service Pl.

W. P. Battalion
10 Officer 1 Officer 2 Officers
2 Warrant Officers 23 99 Enlisted Men
308 Enlisted Men T/O & E 10-67
Administration Enlisted Men 542
will furnish
orderlies,
water detail,
police,
sanitation,
labor
Mess
Supply
Transportation
Defense
Utilities
Medical
19-37
5 Officers
165 Enlisted Men

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
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Company Hq.	Transportation Sec	Mess Section	Supply Section	Utilities Sec	Defense Platoon	Med. Section
2 Officers	90 vehicles	3 Kitchens	1 Officer	15 E.M.	2 Office	11 E.M.
1 W.O.	3 officers	5 Mess Halls	17 E.M.	1 S/Sgt. Chief Sec.	72 E.M.	1 Maj-Surge
7 E.M.	113 E.M.	1 Gen Mess	1 1st Lt. Supp.	3-T/4 Carpenter	1 2d Lt. Pl. Ldr	1 Capt.-De
1 Capt., C.O.	1 Capt. Motor Off.	2 Off Mess	1 S/Sgt. Supply	1 Electrician	1 T/Sgt. Pl. Sgt.	1 S/Sgt. Assst.
1 Capt., C.O.	1 1st Lt. Asst.	Fwd Ech	1 S/Sgt. Supply	1 Refrigeration	1 Sgt. PI.	1 Sgt. PI.
1 W.O., Pers.	1 M/Sgt. Chief Sec.	Rear Ech	1 Sgt. Laundry	5 Sgts-Squad Ldrs	1 T/3 Sun	1 Cheif
1 1st Lt. Pers.	2 T/Sgt-1tr Sgt.	2 EM Mess	1 Sgt. Laundry	66 Pvts	1 Fec	1 T/4 Med
1 T/3 clerk-stenog.	Crew Chief	Fwd Ech	1 T/4	3-elec. helpers	1 Cpl Supp	1 Cpl Supp
1 Sgt., Mail	5 S/Sgt-3 Pl. Ldrs.	Rear Tech	1 Clerk	4-carp. helpers	3 T/5 2 M	3 T/5 2 M
1 W.O., Pers.	1 Asst Shop	1 Officer	2 Type. Repair	7 messenger	1 S 1 S	1 S 1 S
1 1st Lt. -Assst	1 Supply	1 W. O.	1 Mech. Boiler-	4 barbers	4 Pvts-ai	4 Pvts-ai
1 4 T/5 -Assst	2 T/3 1 C.G. Chauff.	73 E. M.	1 Laundry			
3 clerk-typ.	1 Dispatcher	1 1st Lt. -Mess	2 T/5			
10 Sqts.	10 Sqts.	1 W.O. Asst Mess	2 Articifer			
10 I/4	9 Sq. Leaders	Officer	Shoe Cobbler			
1 Asst CG Chauff.	1 Asst. Disp.	9 Sq. Leaders	Pvts			
8 Mechanics	3 S/Sgt-Mess Sgt	1 T/Sgt. Chief	4 Laundry			
1 Clerk	1 per kitchen	9 Sq. Leaders	5 Basic			
35 T/5	5 T/4-1st cooks	1 S/Sgt-Mess Sgt	Laundry Section			
7 mechanics	12 T/5, 6 2d cooks	1 per kitchen	to have a			
8 Dock drivers	2 bakers	5 T/4-1st cooks	QM laundry			
9 2½ ton drivers	2 D.R. Orderly	12 T/5	2 D.R. Orderly			
10 Weasel drivers	19 PFC-17 Cooks Help.	19 PFC-17 Cooks Help.	unit. 12 E.M.			
1 1½ ton driver	1 Gen Mess	1 Gen Mess				
48 PFCs & Pvts	16-4 per shift	16-4 per shift				
Drivers	2 Bakers Assst.	2 Bakers Assst.				
	33 Pvts. - 18 K.P's	33 Pvts. - 18 K.P's				
	3 Gen Mess	3 Gen Mess				
	16 - 4 per shift	16 - 4 per shift				
	15 D.R. Orderlies	15 D.R. Orderlies				
	1 Gen Mess	1 Gen Mess				
	2 E.M. Less	2 E.M. Less				
	12 Off. Less	12 Off. Less				

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OPERATIONAL CHART
SECTION XXIV CORPS

1 Med. Section
2 Office
11 E.M.
1 Maj-Surge
1 Capt.-Den
1 S/Sgt Sec
1 Cheif
1 Drs 1 T/3 Surge
1 T/4 Med
1 Cpl Supp
3 T/5 2 Med
1 T/4 1 Supp
4 Pvts-1
1 T/4 Med
1 Cpl Supp
3 T/5 2 Med
1 T/4 1 Supp
4 Pvts-1
Men



* Attached to Section.
● Personnel from Signal Photo Unit.

ANNEX #7

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ANNEX #8

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Approximate Reserve	1200	3000	100	3000	200	100	500	600	100	2300	200	230
TOTAL	4,500	3,200	200	3,300	300	200	800	4,000	300	2,400	200	2,400

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HEAD OF APARTES XXIV CORPS

APPENDIX 8

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the G-2
Intelligence Section
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SUBJECT: Interrogation . . . For the guidance and information of all concerned.

1. It is necessary that the interrogator be thoroughly prepared before commencing interrogations. He should be familiar with the terrain, be up on the local order of battle, and the situation. If division reports are available they should be studied carefully.

2. Check the division report thoroughly, take nothing for granted. Check information with JOB. If information does not check with known information get a reasonable explanation. If PW is a specialist, request an officer in PW's field to assist in interrogation.

3. Interrogator must get every possible bit of useful information the PW has, interrogator must not jump to the conclusion that because PW is illiterate or stupid that, he knows nothing. Such men may have precisely the information that is needed. Keep constantly in mind that small scraps of information of apparently no value may be the link that completes the chain. It takes scraps of information from various sources to make the whole picture. If information is repetitious, repeat it. It may be the necessary confirmation needed to lend credence to other reports upon which important decisions may be based. Make the end product have intelligence value. You are an important member of the intelligence collecting agencies. Upon information supplied by you men's lives are gambled. Be constantly aware of your responsibility to these men. Remember men's lives depend upon your accuracy and diligence. Don't fail them!

4. When writing reports, see that they are concise, free from irrelevant matter, written in such a way that it can have only one meaning. It is necessary that every interrogator be able to prepare reports for publication.

5. Point by point discussion of interrogation form:

A. PERSONAL DETAILS: the name in KANJI will follow the name in ROMAJI. Unit will be listed by code name, code number, CO's name, Platoon, Company, Battalion, Regiment and Division.

B. ASSESSMENT: fill in the age, education, and vocation. This will give some indication of what can be expected. When the interrogation is concluded, complete the remaining points. Using a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 as the highest and 5 as the lowest. PW's military experience, occupation, and place of residence will suggest points for further questioning.

C. TACTICAL INFORMATION: the letter order for the subject matter will be preserved. If no information is available for a particular subject the paragraph and letter may be omitted; for example, a report may have paragraphs "a, b, c, d, h, k, n and o" and will be so lettered.

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a. Chronology: the Chronology will begin with induction and continue to date of capture. Details of capture will be included. Record PW's class at induction, unit inducted into and all subsequent units assigned to and their location. Detailed movements are unnecessary but all units and location of such units with dates will be reported. When moving by sea, names of ships, tonnages, number in convoy, number of escort craft, ships damaged or sunk will be noted. A detailed chronology is desired for the movement of PW's unit subsequent to our landing. Where and when PW separated from unit.

b. Organization and Strength: This will include TO strength and organization and strength and organization of PW's unit when he left it; the place and date are important. This is best shown by diagrammatic layout, including weapon and vehicle allotments. The weapon strength will be given for TE and strength at the last time PW was with his unit.

c. Positions: In locating installations:

(1) PW's unit constructed.

(2) Installations PW saw.

(3) Reported installations.

Defense Zones:

(1) Emplacements: size, material and manner of construction.

(2) Minefields: size, location, number of mines, including bombs and shells used as mines, type of mine.

(3) Anti-personnel mines: location, type.

(4) Wire entanglements: height, breadth, type, location.

(5) Tank traps: location, type.

(6) Tank ditches: location, length, depth, width, profile.

(7) Road blocks: location, material, covering fire.

(8) CPs location, location of batteries served.

(9) CPs: location, type of shelter, personnel, unit.

(10) Ammunition dumps: location, size, type of ammunition, unit.

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(11) Fuel dumps: location, size, type of fuel, unit.

(9) Ops: location, type of strikes, etc.

(10) Ammunition dumps: location, size, type of ammunition, unit.

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ANNEX #9

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(11) Refueling station, size, type of fuel, unit.

(12) Food dumps: location, size, unit.

(13) Water supply point: location, size, units supplied.

(14) Hospitals: location, size, number of patients, units served.

(15) Standing patrols: routes travelled, time, strength.

(16) Any other obstacles not covered above.

d. Knowledge of other units:

- (1) Code name, number, officers, strength, weapons. When and where he saw them.
- (2) Units he heard about.
- (3) Insignia of new units.
- (4) Has PW seen or heard of recently formed or reorganized units; if so, where, when, from what units formed, strength, weapons. Officers and identification.

(5) Special troops: paratroops, airborne, commandos, mechanized, etc.

(6) Civilian militia:

(a) ZAIGO GUNJIN

(b) SEINENDAN.

1. Are they organized and equipped, officers' strength?

2. Are civilians fighting as a unit or as guerrilla?

e. Unit Duties: Under this will be enemy methods, techniques, and missions. More detail will be included when the unit is not one of the arms. Special training and unusual missions will be noted here.

f. Wastage and Casualties:

(1) Naval losses and damage.

(2) Land losses.

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ANNEX #9

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(3) Losses in equipment and supplies.

(a) Due to US actions.

(b) Due to abandonment.

(4) Shortage in equipment and material.

(5) Casualties:

(a) Killed:

1. How many?

2. Where?

3. When?

4. By what?

5. Disposition of dead.

(b) Wounded:

1. Treatment.

2. Disposition.

(c) Percentage of unit incapacitated.

a. Communications:

(1) Message centers.

(2) Radios: location, type, units, service.

(3) Radar stations, locations.

(4) Railroads. Traffic.

(5) Roads:

(a) Troop travel, frequency.

(b) Those traveled at night.

(6) Telephone lines.

(7) Switchboards, location.

(8) Supply and evacuation routes: time used.

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b. Dispositions of personnel in rear areas.

(7) Switchboards, location.

(8) Supply and evacuation routes, time used.

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ANEX #9
h. Disposition of forces in operational areas

(1) Location of units (nature of enemy operations) locate more specifically the identified units.

(a) Infantry

(b) Artillery, mortars, dual purpose guns, MG.

(2) Location and strength of reserves (i.e. any force of troops no matter how small).

(3) Truck, tank and artillery parks.

i. Intentions:

(1) Intention of PW's unit when he left it.

(a) Date and location when he left unit.

(b) How were they going to execute their intentions?

(c) Source and date of information: Rumors, orders, etc.

(2) General intention of enemy's total force.

(a) Plan of attack.

(b) Defense plan:

1. Delaying action.

2. Withdrawal.

3. Fixed line.

4. Withdrawal to prepared position.

5. Counterattacks. (This will be stressed as enemy situation becomes increasingly difficult).

a. Assembly area.

b. Strength

c. Time

d. Plan.

j. Weapons and equipment:

(1) New artillery pieces.

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- (2) New small arms.
- (3) New mines and grenades and booby traps.
- (4) New tanks.
- (5) Explosives.
- (6) Bombs, ammunitions and pyrotechnics.
- (7) Uniforms and personnel equipment.
- (8) Personal armor.
- (9) Instruments.

k. Chemical Warfare:

- (1) Gas shells and bombs.
- (2) Gas masks.
- (3) Gas protective clothing.
- (4) Incendiary materials.
- (5) Smoke apparatus.
- (6) Disposition of poison gas dumps, if any.

l. Personalities:

- (1) Personalities in PW's unit and other units. Indicate those that have been killed in action or evacuated.
- (2) Identification of any officer not otherwise listed in the report.
- (3) Civilian personalities.
 - (a) Civil officials.
 - (b) Leaders of ZAIGO GUNJIN.
 - (c) Leaders of civil militia.
 - (d) Leaders of SEINENDAN.

m. Morale factors:

- (1) PW's unit morale.

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m. Morale factors:

(1) PW unit morale.

ANNEX #9

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(2) PW's attitude toward capture.

(3) PW's attitude toward the war.

(4) Mail

(5) War news.

(6) Allied leaflets.

(7) Radio propaganda.

(8) Effectiveness of U.S. propaganda.

(9) How can it be improved?

(10) Are they holding out because they have been told:

(a) Reinforcements are coming from Japan?

(b) Fleet is coming.

(c) Air force is coming.

(11) What are the current rumors?

(12) Will enemy surrender if given the opportunity?

n. General:

(1) Intelligence and security.

(2) Deception and treachery.

(3) Knowledge of US:

(a) Losses.

(b) Plans.

(c) Situation.

(4) US PW's.

(5) Captured US materials.

(6) Are they searching US dead and if so, are they obtaining information?

(7) Effect of US NGF, artillery and bombing. What is most effective?

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- (a) Location of civilian masses.
- (b) Civilian food situation.
- (c) Civilian attitude.
- (9) Terrain:
 - (a) Rice paddies near coast.
 - 1. Depth of mud.
 - 2. Depth of water.
 - 3. Height of dykes.
 - (b) Depth of mud in swamps.
 - (c) Soil:
 - 1. Consistency.
 - 2. Depth
 - 3. Soil trafficability.
 - (d) Material of houses.
 - (e) Rivers:
 - 1. Depth.
 - 2. Width
 - (f) Bridge:
 - 1. Width
 - 2. Length.
 - 3. Strength.
 - (g) Location of public buildings.
 - (h) Endemic diseases.
 - (i) Drinking water sources.
 - (j) Food storage places.

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of AG of S G-2

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS

Office of AC of S, G-2

Language Section

SUBJECT: Suggested Questions to be asked of PsW to obtain targets for Corps Artillery.

1. Corps artillery is interested in receiving information from which long range fires can be planned on the following rear area installations:

- a. Enemy artillery.
- b. Tank concentrations and repair points.
- c. Landing points for transports, landing craft and barges.
- d. Depots and dumps for ammunition, gas and oil, food, aviation supplies, water points.
- e. Regimental and higher echelon CPs, OPs, and radio stations.
- f. Routes of communication and supply.
- g. Troop reserve and bivouac areas.
- h. Landing fields, airstrips, hangers, revetments.
- i. Location and type of strong fortifications.

Direct observation agencies alone are seldom able to give corps artillery the necessary information regarding the above targets. For this reason this information must be procured through every possible intelligence source. PW interrogations are valuable in this regard. PsW cannot always supply complete information but very often they can supply important clues which can be used by the corps artillery.

The following suggested lines of questioning are therefore set out in some detail. The object of the questions is to get from Ps W, as early in their chain of interrogations as possible, indications or any clues which would lead to discovery of corps artillery long range targets.

2. Enemy Artillery Positions:

a. Discussion: Few PsW will have positive information such as having seen a battery in position or a gun position being dug, but many may have valuable indirect information. The following indications are helpful none-the-less.

- b. Indications:

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- (1) Has PW seen artillery pieces being moved on roads; when, where, direction of movement. (For the few Pw's who will have seen any, show them a picture of Jap artillery and have them identify the types they have seen. The model number of certain 75mm guns will determine whether it is a weapon used by the infantry or by the artillery. Also obtain type of prime-mover used to tow pieces and number of caissons or trailers with piece).
- (2) Has PW heard the sound of Jap artillery firing, direction sound came from, where he was at the time, when he heard it.
- (3) Has PW seen observing instruments on hill tops; when, where.
- (4) Has PW observed telephone lines running or being laid to hill tops, where, when.
- (5) Has PW observed radio sets in operation, where, when.
- (6) Has PW seen artillery personnel carrying or using transits or other survey instruments; where, when.
- (7) Has PW observed artillery ammunition being hauled; where, when, direction of movement. If possible, show PW a picture set of Jap artillery projectiles and have him identify what he has seen.
- (8) Has PW seen piles of artillery projectiles, when, where. (105mm projectiles are packed two to a wood box; 155 mm in individual wood boxes; 75mm shells are often four in a box).

3. Tank Concentrations Areas and Repair Points:

a. Discussion: Information by deduction on this item are practically nil. The PW will either have seen tanks or not. If he has seen any of them, the following circumstances are vital:

- (1) Moving tanks; when, where were they seen, direction of movement. How many; any being towed.
- (2) Stationary Tanks; when, where, were men working around them with tools, gas drums there, tank parts there. How many tanks.
- (3) Camouflage used for tanks.

4. Landing Points for Transports, Landing Craft and Barges:

a. Discussion: Best determined from recital of Pw's experiences.

b. Indications:

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- (1) Where PW landed, night or day, type craft used. (Show PW pictures of craft).
- (2) Supplies and equipment landed at same place.
- (3) Did PW see any other places where troops and supplies were landed.
- (4) Any men of his outfit return to beaches for supplies; where, when.
- (5) Any camouflage used at beach.
- (6) Type of ships or craft seen.

5. Supply dumps or depots (Ammunition, food, gas & oil, aviation and water points, routes of supply):

a. Discussion: This is a difficult field due to the Japanese habit of dispersing their supplies in small quantities along roads, under rock overhangs and in brush and trees. Aside from actually seeing a dump or water point at a certain time and place, the following indications are valuable:

b. Indications:

- (1) Saw trucks or carts hauling supplies; what the supplies were, when, where, direction of movement, have conversation with drivers, where they started from and their destination.
- (2) Where personnel of his unit went to get various types of supplies; how often, route taken.
- (3) Where unit procured its water. Purify it in unit or already purified.
- (4) Carts, trucks and troops move at night on roads or in day.

6. Regimental and Higher Echelon CPs, OPs, Radio Stations:

a. Discussion: This is a broad field for deduction.

b. Indications:

- (1) Where does unit messenger go to get the orders; how often; ever talk with your messenger.
- (2) Has he seen officers and messengers using a particular road or trail when going to destination.
- (3) Has he seen a number of telephone lines at any one place; when, where they were laid.

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- (4) What is highest ranking Jap officer he has seen; where, when, what he was doing, other officers present, was there a house or a tent there.
- (5) See any staff cars any place; when, where.
- (6) See any radio antennas or steel towers any place; when, where.
- (7) See anybody using signal flags or panels; when, where.

7. Troop Reserve and Bivouac Areas:

a. Discussion: Best determined by a recital of PW's own experiences and movements of his unit (Use Map).

b. Indications: Where PW first camped when he landed, when was it, were other troops there too, see any cooking fires of other units near where he camped, were tents used, were native houses used.

8. Landing Fields, Airstrips, Hangars, Revetments:

a. Discussion: This is limited to direct inquiry on the subject. Where the PW has seen the items set out in the title, whether or not the runways are surfaced, is field used at night, where personnel live, has he seen any AA guns, where were they, how big are the guns.

9. Location and Type of Strong Fortifications:

a. Discussion: This is likewise an item almost wholly dependent on the personal knowledge and observations of the PW. Items desired are location, materials used for construction (concrete, steel rails, logs), how long work on position was carried on, is barbed wire used, any weapons emplaced, location and caliber.

Collateral information can be obtained from PW's if they have had conversations with others who have worked in the fortifications or hauled material up to them.

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of AC of S, G-2
Language Section

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XXIVCI --
Date

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT
(Preliminary Interrogation)

Interrogator No. :
Assistant No. :

PW received
Date

Time: Hrs.

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:

PW Name :
PW Number :
Enemy Serial No. :
Unit :

Rank:
Duty:

Place of Capture:
Date of Capture :

Time: Hrs.

Age :
Education :
Residence :
Vocation :

2. ASSESSMENT:

a. Detail of Capture:
b. Mil. Ser.: Yrs. Mos.
c. Comparative Observation:
d. Comparative Mil. Knowledge:
e. Comparative Intelligence:
f. Attitude:
g. Reliability:
h. Recommendation for further examination:

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:

a. Chronology:
b. Organization and Strength:
c. Positions:
d. Knowledge of Other Units:
e. Unit Duties:
f. Wastage and Casualties:
g. Communications:
h. Dispositions of Units in Operational Area:
i. Intentions:
j. Weapons and Equipment:
k. Chemical Warfare:

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1. Personalities:
m. Morale Factors:
n. General:

4. REMARKS:

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G - 2.

25 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM - Duties of Executive Officer, G-2 Section.

1. The following is an outline of the duties of the executive officer of the G-2 Section. In the performance of these duties he will normally have one clerical assistant and for the initial phases of the operation one officer.

2. Administrative Duties.

a. Ordinary (Before and during combat).

Receive all incoming letters, documents, publications and objective data. Peruse and note those items which are of interest to G-2 Section. Consult appropriate subsection for recommendations on distribution.

Prepare drafts of letters or recommended action on administrative matters.

Maintain close supervision over personnel matters in G-2 Section.

Be custodian of Joint Intelligence Center, POA Materiel Stamp and clear souvenier items of materiel.

Maintain a comprehensive file of appropriate objective material.

Maintain a record of classified documents issued to or by the G-2 Section.

Make periodic checks on individual arms and equipment.

During combat insure that individuals have individual arms and helmet with them at all times.

Whenever vehicles are issued to subsections make periodic checks on maintenance.

Check on daily police of area and orderly arrangement of subsections.

b. Preparation for Combat.

Maintain close liaison with headquarters commandant on requirements for loading and dates of loading.

See that we have all equipment for combat

Check on requirements for patrols and patrolling.

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Check on preparation of UP & T Tables.

c. During Combat.

Responsible for movement of G-2 Section ashore and establishment of the G-2 portion of the CP.

Erection of tentage.

Installation of facilities - lights and telephones, etc.

Digging in of Operations Section and subsections.

Designation and location of individual foxholes. Do not permit area to become too congested and keep area of Operations Tent free of such installations if possible.

See that necessary latrines and dumps are dug.

Coordinate with Headquarters Commandant for close in defense of CP.

Prepare and post plane for close in defense of CP. See that all personnel are informed. Rehearse.

Post sentries necessary for air warning and protection.

See that members of section are provided with water and rations. Prior to the establishment of a mess provide facilities for heating water.

See that a guard is maintained over all property and equipment at all times.

Run daily check on welfare of all personnel of the section.

3. Control and Supervision of Subsections.

The Executive Officer will coordinate the activities of all subsections of the G-2 Section. Specific responsibilities for individual subsections are:

a. PI Team:

See that PI Team is familiar with current essential elements of intelligence for photo interpretation and that their priorities of work are in accordance with the tactical situation.

Check daily and standing request for photo coverage. See that Army or Commander Support Air are advised of priorities.

See that liaison is maintained on airfield from which photo missions are being flown.

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Exercise supervision over map supply and distribution.

Check reproduction and distribution of aerial photos.

b. Drafting Section.

Check setup and facilities.

c. Order of Battle Team.

Check administrative setup of Team.

Insure that team is familiar with the situation and has essential elements of intelligence for Order of Battle.

See that OB paragraph for Daily G-2 Periodic Report is prepared.

d. CIC.

The CIC Team is an integral part of the G-2 Section. It functions under and through the G-2 Section and is responsible only to the CG XXIV Corps. It is not responsible to Army, POA or the War Department.

The team has a very important mission. It has no officers and will require close supervision.

Insure that close coordination is maintained with Provost Marshal and Military Government.

See that CIC maintains a post at the Civilian PW Enclosure.

Principal mission is a check on internal security by keeping enemy military personnel from civilians, checking provisions for security in the Corps rear area particularly control posts on highways, sabotage, and civilians at large in the military areas.

Insure that information gathered is transmitted without delay to the G-2 Operations Section.

Check over daily CIC report and weekly reports.

Check on all details handled as a matter of liaison with CIC of Army or Divisions.

e. Language Team (ISO)

See that the team has the essential elements of intelligence for captured documents and interrogation of PW's.

Check with Provost Marshal on needs for interpreters at the PW Enclosure.

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See that PW's are interrogated promptly and keep informed at all times of the number of PW's in the stockade and how long they have been there.

Check on quantity of documents received, their processing and sorting. See that only documents of immediate tactical value are translated and that all others are evacuated immediately to Army Translation Center.

Insure close cooperation of the Language Team with the Order of Battle Team.

Check on clearance of souvenier documents.

Check on administrative organization of section.

f. Public Relations Team.

Check on administrative setup of section.

See that Public Relations Office is advised of items of Public Relations interest.

Check on handling of civilian correspondents.

Have Public Relations Officer submit daily report of activities.

g. Joint Intelligence Center, POA Team.

This team is attached by Joint Intelligence Center, POA for purposes of Technical Intelligence.

Teams will operate in the Corps zone of action. All reports will be submitted through XXIV Corps G-2 Section.

Get daily report of activities from this team.

h. Topo Detachment.

Keep informed of the work being performed by the Topo Detachment and arrange for priorities where necessary.

CECIL W. NIST
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

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